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INTRODUCTION
places less emphasis on "competitive liberalization" and somewhat more weight on region-to-region agreements and multilateral WTO talks. 5 Frustrated with the slow pace of the Doha Round and lackluster momentum in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and mindful of US-and EU-centered FTA networks, Asian countries have joined the FTA game. FTAs in Asia began as regional groupings, starting with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 and later with APEC in 1989, but these have made limited progress in reducing significant trade barriers. In the late 1990s, many Asian nations shifted from a single-minded emphasis on the multilateral WTO system to a consideration of FTAs as part of their trade-negotiating strategy. By 2005, Asian countries (excluding China) had ratified 14 bilateral and regional FTAs and had negotiated but not implemented another seven (see table 3 ). Asian nations are also actively negotiating some 23 bilateral and regional FTAs, many with non-Asian partners, including Australia (a country that often thinks of itself as Asian), Canada, Chile, the European Union, India, and Qatar (see table 3 ). (see table 4 ). Since 2000, it has negotiated eight FTAs (three regional and five bilateral) and proposed another nine (two regional and seven bilateral).
Why is China pursuing FTAs? Seemingly for a blend of foreign policy and economic reasons, much like the United States and the European Union. Regional and bilateral talks offer a more efficient forum for liberalizing trade than the WTO, where agreements require a consensus of 148 sovereign nations. Asian FTAs also enable China to confirm its commitment to trade liberalization and acquire negotiating experience before defining a leadership role in the WTO.
Economically, FTAs provide a framework to maintain an open trading system and minimize the likelihood of outright supply shortages in the event of commodity price spikes. Politically, FTAs can be an important tool of commercial diplomacy to institutionalize economic partnerships. China also uses FTAs, such as the ASEAN-China FTA, first proposed by former Premier Zhu Rongji in 2000, to allay neighbors that fear being hollowed out by Chinese competition. 5 In September 2004, former EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy cautioned Singapore that an EU-Singapore FTA was not in the cards because the European Union places first priority on multilateral liberalization under the WTO. If that fails, the European Union focuses on regional FTAs, such as a possible ASEAN-EU agreement. See Vikram Khanna, "EU Paving Way for Eventual FTA with ASEAN," Business Times Singapore, September 8, 2004. 6 Of these three completed FTAs, only two, with Hong Kong and Macao, have entered into force.
CHINA'S ECONOMIC INFLUENCE
Thanks to an average annual growth rate of 9 percent over the past 25 years, China has emerged as an economic power. Correspondingly, China is now the dominant economic force in East Asia, where intraregional trade has grown faster than in other areas of the world economy. China is also the world's largest recipient of foreign direct investment, and much of the investment is aimed at export-oriented production. As a consequence of its trade and investment policies, China exemplifies the classic story of triangular commerce: exporting finished and semi-finished manufactures, while importing raw materials, semi-finished components, and capital goods. 7 China's trade surplus with the United States was $162 billion in 2004 and with the European Union, $98 billion, but it runs persistent trade deficits with several Asian countries, including Indonesia ($1 billion), Australia ($1 billion), Japan ($15 billion), Korea ($23 billion), Malaysia ($8 billion), Taiwan ($40 billion), and Thailand ($5 billion) (see table 5 ). 8 While Chinese import markets provide the economic spark for much of Asia, Chinese exports offer fierce competition in third-country markets. Imports are concentrated in raw and semifinished materials and capital goods; export competition is most keen in finished manufactures.
China's share of total exports from newly industrialized economies (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) increased from about 8 percent in 1990 to 15 percent in 1997 to nearly 20 percent in 2002 (Krumm and Kharas 2003) . ASEAN is now the fourth largest supplier of raw materials to China.
CHINA AND FTA INITIATIVES
In economic terms, China's choice of FTA partners (after Hong Kong and Macao) foremost reflects China's demand for raw commodities (see table 5 ). China's pursuit of FTAs thus extends from the Gulf Cooperation Council to Brazil and Australia. 9 China is currently the second largest consumer and importer of petroleum, and its demand for crude oil is expected to grow by 4 percent annually over the next decade. In fact, bilateral trade with Australia is booming because of Chinese consumption of commodities, especially crude oil, natural gas, copper, and iron ore, which accounted 7 According to Goldman Sachs, nearly 80 percent of intraregional exports to China are intermediate and capital goods and raw materials. See Zebregs (2004) and Ng and Yeats (2003 . According to the New Zealand government, there is "no universally accepted definition of a 'market economy' " and China "now has enough of the key characteristics of a 'market economy' to be regarded as one." See New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2005, 2004) . In April 2005, Australia became the second industrial country to grant China market economy status. Like New Zealand, Australia waived its right to apply discriminatory AD and safeguard measures against China as outlined under the Chinese WTO accession protocol. See Australia Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Market Economy Status," available at www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/fta/facts/market_economy.html (accessed on June 1, 2005) . 27 The ASEAN+3 has been holding regular meetings of its finance ministers since 1998 and plans to hold the first East Asia Summit in 2005. Other proposals to promote Asian economic regionalism include a docking mechanism within a web of Japanese bilateral agreements. For example, China and ASEAN would be included in a bilateral Japan-Korea FTA. See Evenett, Venables, and Winters (2004) . A regional Asian FTA that includes two highly protected sectors-agriculture and servicescould lead to significant economic benefits. However, the core gains, and the biggest obstacles, are to be found in Northeast Asia-an FTA that links China, Japan, and Korea. According to one estimate (again probably conservative), a Northeast Asian FTA would raise Chinese GDP by more than 2
percent (Scollay and Gilbert 2001).
While a pan-Asian FTA that encompasses Northeast Asia would have significant economic payoff, it faces enormous hurdles. Japan and South Korea are strongly opposed to removing agricultural barriers. Historic animosity and possible military rivalry between Japan and China also make a pan-Asian FTA even more problematic. 29
CONCLUSION
So far there is little evidence that the FTA process-whatever its shortcomings-is leading to a three-bloc configuration of the world economy. To be sure, the European Union is an economic bloc, but its "out-of-area" FTAs do not add up to an EU-centered bloc. While the United States is the anchor of FTAs in the Western Hemisphere, including NAFTA, CAFTA-DR, and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), currently it is most actively engaged in concluding multiple FTAs in the Middle East. Moreover, the FTAA project is not doing well at the moment.
The ASEAN-China FTA is probably the most ambitious and active initiative in East Asia.
However, in addition to ASEAN-China, about eight regional agreements are associated with As is commonly known, GDP growth among the core EU countries is anemic. The European Central Bank recently cut its growth forecast for the European Union to between 1.1 and 1.7 percent. 33 The recent rejection of the EU constitutional treaty by France and the Netherlands suggests that political unity in the European Union is a distant proposition (Shell International Ltd. 2005) . A single European voice on foreign policy and a pan-European military force are both remote.
A looming if low-probability economic concern is a crisis in the euro area as Italy approaches national bankruptcy. Thus, while the European Union has successfully enlarged its economic membership to include ten peripheral economies, as a political venture the European Union faces significant obstacles.
30 ASEAN-related FTAs and financial integration measures include ASEAN, ASEAN+CER, ASEAN-Japan, ASEAN-Korea, ASEAN-China, ASEAN+3, and the Chiang Mai initiative (see table 3 ). 31 Asian FTAs are based on East and Southeast Asian partners. Non-Asian FTAs include South Asian (India and Pakistan) and Pacific partners (Australia and New Zealand). 32 Emerging Asia includes China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. See Zebregs (2004) . 33 German GDP is expected to grow by only 1.1 percent in 2005. In France, more than one worker in ten is unemployed.
In the post-NAFTA era, US trade with Canada and Mexico has grown twice as fast as US trade with the rest of the world. 34 The past decade has been prosperous in the United States and Canada. Mexico has not performed nearly up to its potential but, after the peso crisis, Mexico did better than most of Latin America. Putting the economic benefits of regional integration aside, political differences divide North America, ranging from the lack of Canadian and Mexican support for the Iraq war to the absence of an immigration accord. Prospects for concluding a trade and investment bloc in the Western Hemisphere through other FTAs, notably the FTAA, are not assured. Even if the FTAA is concluded, it certainly does not portend a political bloc organized around Washington.
To conclude, on present evidence, the FTA process embraced with some enthusiasm in Asia, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere more closely resembles fingers reaching idiosyncratically around the globe than the formation of politico-economic blocs centered respectively on Beijing, Brussels, and Washington. 
